In this paper, we propose a new class of dynamic order book models based on the multiplicative error framework introduced by Engle (2002) . In doing so, we overcome the main challenges faced by the standard linear framework in modelling non-negative valued processes, namely 1) the possibility to predict negative values, 2) the difficulty in handling the additive disturbances to ensure non-negativity, and 3) the inability to accomodate valid zero values if we resort to log transformation as a solution to the non-negativity constraint. Inheriting the well understood modelling strategies and specifications from the vast volatility literature, our models help reveal important insights into the dynamic interactions between liquidity and volatility in the U.S. Treasury market. We find that liquidity decreases in price volatility, but increases in liquidity volatility. This seems to suggest that liquidity suppliers reduce their supply in response to price risk, but liquidity risk makes the provision of liquidity more valuable to the market place and induces more supply.
Introduction
The interest in being able to understand the dynamics of limit order liquidity and price volatility in the Treasury market stems from the importance of U.S. Treasury securities in portfolio and risk management.
1 In particular, investors consider these securities as safe assets, an indispensable part of most investors' portfolios, and highly liquid. The high level of liquidity in these Treasury securities enables market participants to quickly disengage from undesirable positions. The flight-to-liquidity premium in Treasury bond prices documented by Longstaff (2004) is a good example of how the plentiful liquidity in the Treasury market is valued by investors. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of the liquidity supply, and accordingly being able to forecast this supply throughout a trading day, is of great interest to the financial community.
The study of limit order book dynamics is also relevant for the large literature on market microstructure devoted to the study of price discovery. Price incorporates news and converges to fundamental value through the trading process. The availability of liquidity is critical to that process: if there is little liquidity, it is hard to see how price could converge to its true value after some shocks. Thus, modelling the evolution of liquidity can complement and further our knowledge on the dynamics of asset prices. This exercise is particularly interesting in an order-driven market setup like the one studied in this paper, since liquidity is supplied by choice and prices are completely determined by limit orders submitted. In contrast to a market setup with designated market makers who are required to provide liquidity and whose price setting can be a black box, the order-driven market setup enables the modelling of liquidity supply decision by its dependence on relevant market conditions that market participants observe.
Empirical models of the limit order book still face many challenges. The paper, in addition to studying the Treasury market limit order book, introduces a new empirical approach that is of general interest. To explain the technical contribution, it is worth elaborating on an inconvenient property shared by many empirical models proposed so far: they possibly predict negative limit order depths.
2 Hence, if we call X t a limit order book generic depth, its predictions are not guaranteed to be non-negative. This has many undesirable consequences. First, the likelihood of such anomalous depth predictions increases 1 While the notion of liquidity is fluid, we will measure and model it in terms of depths of the limit order book. Market depths (in plural) will refer to the depth at multiple tiers, while market depth (singular) refers to the depth at a particular tier.
2 Many empirical limit order book models adopt a linear Gaussian framework. For example, Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) use a regression framework to study the dynamics of the number of limit orders posted. Likewise, Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) regress trade size and number of transactions on volatility to document the existence of a volume-volatility relationship in the Norwegian equity market. Härdle, Hautsch, and Mihoci (2009) propose a dynamic semiparametric factor approach to modeling liquidity supply, combining non-parametric factor decomposition for the order curve's spatial structure with VAR for time variations of factor loadings. Other studies similar in their use of VAR include Danielsson and Payne (2010) and Hautsch and Huang (2009) , among others. Ranaldo (2004) uses an ordered probit regression framework to analyze how the state of the limit order book affects order submission strategy. In Russell and Kim (2010) , the log of total market depth is modelled as an ARMA process. 1 with market stress. Second, since the conditional mean of limit order book depth predictions must be positive, the corresponding error terms cannot be more negative than the mean to ensure non-negativity. This means that the range of the error term changes with every observation, resulting in estimation difficulties. Third, even if we study the log(X t ) to avoid the non-negativity issue, researchers run into the problem of exact zero values at which log(X t ) is not defined. While this is not an issue if the process being modelled is strictly positive, 3 this approach is problematic when zeros are valid observations. In fact, since disappearing depth of the book is common far away from the bid-ask midpoint and before major announcements (e.g. Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) ), the occurrence of zero depths is of key interest.
The new class of models we introduce circumvents these problems. The key insight is that we make empirical limit order book models look much like asset price volatility models. Namely, we rely on the multiplicative error model (MEM) specification proposed by Engle (2002) to model volatility dynamics and adapt it to limit order book data. This has several advantages. First, we can readily borrow many specifications and modeling strategies from the vast volatility literature. For example, we can study the effect of news via so called news impact curves, see e.g. Engle and Ng (1993) . Second, we can easily study the interactions of price volatility and limit order book dynamics within a well understood and unified framework. Third, non-negativity of depth -and obviously volatility -is guaranteed within the MEM specification. This rules out nonsensical predictions and therefore addresses many of the issues discussed in the previous paragraph.
The cross-fertilization of insights from the volatility literature to that of limit order books goes beyond modeling strategies -it also pertains to measurement. In the past decade, the notion of the so-called realized (price) volatility has been extensively studied (see the recent survey by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2007) ). We introduce the notion of limit order book depth realized volatility -which measures the variability of liquidity using higher frequency data. Namely, our modeling strategy consists of taking five-minute snapshots of the book as well as measuring one-second changes in the book. The latter allows us to compute for every five-minute interval the realized quadratic variation at all levels of the limit order book. This provides us with a measure of liquidity risk, similar to that of price risk studied with the widely used quadratic variation in the volatility literature. In fact, one could argue that measuring the variability of depth at high frequency is easier than measuring the variability of prices, since the latter are contaminated by the so-called microstructure noise whereas depths are not.
4 Thanks to this new measure of realized depth volatility, we can 3 For instance, in Hautsch and Huang (2009) -a study that examines the market impact of limit ordersthe variable of interest is the depth after the arrival of a limit order, which is always positive, so taking log is a natural modelling choice. Hall and Hautsch (2007) investigate the buy and sell intensity in a limit order book based on a bivariate autoregressive intensity model, and adopt a log linear function for the dynamic intensity component to ensure positivity. This also works well since the buy and sell intensities are strictly positive. Likewise, Russell and Kim (2010) model total market depth, which practically can be assumed to be strictly positive.
4 See again Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2007) for a discussion of the computation of realized volatility in the presence of microstructure noise. study the impact of liquidity uncertainty on the level of liquidity. Needless to say, the realized depth volatility is obviously also a non-negative process. Hence, our modeling strategy is perfectly suited to include this new measure as well.
Using the limit order book data for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury notes over the period from 2006 through to 2009, our class of models reveals several important results. Most important of all, liquidity is expected to decrease following an increase in price volatility, apparently suggesting that liquidity suppliers in this market tend to reduce their supply, and accordingly their exposure, when the level of price uncertainty goes up. Interestingly, at times of little price risk, the supply of liquidity actually increases, especially at the best quotes.
In the reverse direction, a negative liquidity shock predicts a further increase in price volatility. This dynamic interaction could help explain episodes of liquidity and volatility feeding on each other and exacerbating a bad shock that could originate from either the liquidity side or volatility side. The liquidity dry-up and the heightened volatility during the recent financial crisis as shown in Figure 3 is a good example.
In contrast to the negative relationship with price volatility, liquidity tends to increase with the level of uncertainty surrounding liquidity supply. We attribute this positive correlation to the possibility that the increased supply uncertainty makes liquidity provision more valuable to the marketplace, thereby stimulating more supply. Lastly, liquidity at a given tier is positively related with the depth at its preceding tier, reflecting the potential impact of some common market factors on the liquidity level across the tiers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a discussion and general set-up of the multiplicative error framework. Section 3 introduces our model specifications for the limit order book. In Section 4, we describe the data and present summary statistics. Empirical findings are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Multiplicative Error Framework for Non-Negative Valued Processes
Our primary interest in this empirical undertaking is to understand how liquidity evolves throughout the day. By liquidity, we mean the market depths -the dollar quantities available for trade at different price levels in the order book for each individual security -henceforth we will use the two terms liquidity and depth interchangeably. These quantities stand ready for execution against market orders from traders who have some demand for immediacy, and/or matching with appropriate orders on the opposite side of the market. It is useful to note that, the distinction between liquidity supply and demand may not be clear in limit order markets. In their comprehensive survey of the limit order book literature, Parlour and Seppi (2008) mention that investors with a demand for liquidity may still choose to post aggressive limit orders -these cases have the flavor of both supply and demand. Therefore, while the liquidity available in the order book (on both sides) is often considered representative of the liquidity supply, some of this liquidity could potentially come from demanders of liquidity who happen to have more patience to wait for their orders to be executed at better prices than those who submit market orders for immediate execution. As mentioned earlier, many empirical models of limit order books are based on an additive error structure. Engle (2002) discusses in detail two main challenges associated with a linear framework, X t = µ t + t , in modeling non-negative processes. First, since the conditional mean is positive, the corresponding error term has to be no more negative than the mean to ensure the non-negativity of X t . This means that the range of the error term changes with every observation, presenting a difficulty for efficient estimation via maximum likelihood. Second, even if log(X t ) is used to avoid the non-negativity issue, researchers run into the problem of exact zero values at which log(X t ) is not defined. Therefore, taking log is not a solution when zeros are valid observations for the process of interest. The multiplicative error specification proposed by Engle (2002) can overcome these challenges and offer more flexibility in the specification of the error distribution. As long as it has a unit mean and non-negative support, there are many possible candidates.
The application of the multiplicative error structure in modeling the dynamics of the Treasury order book is a natural choice, in light of the disadvantages suffered by additive error models. This is important since market depth levels in an order book are non-negative. Any chosen model must be able to forecast non-negative depths for it to have economic meaning, as well as to produce consistent estimates without imposing too restrictive assumptions on the model. Additionally, the GARCH-type nature of the multiplicative error model allows us to capture well the persistence, another important economic feature, of market depths. The persistence in the limit order book at intradaily frequencies has been documented in prior literature, see for example Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) . Intuitively, depths queue at different price levels in the book waiting to be executed by coming trades. Over a short time interval, say five-minute, we do not expect these queues to vary substantially, especially the outer tiers, because these are not reached until trades exhaust liquidity at the inside tier first.
The ability of multiplicative error models to capture the non-negativeness and persistence of a dynamic process gives this class of models an important place in the finance literature, since many financial series possess these properties. Important applications of this framework in finance include the modeling of conditional trade duration (see Engle and Russell (1998) ), volatilities, trading volume and intensities (see Manganelli (2000) ), volatilities, average trade sizes, trading costs and number of trades (see Hautsch and Jeleskovic (2008) ), absolute returns, daily range and realized volatility (see Engle and Gallo (2006) ), among others. However, despite it being a valuable tool for modeling non-negative valued processes, we have not seen an application of this framework among limit order book models.
The closest work to ours, in terms of modelling framework, is by Hautsch and Jeleskovic (2008) . This paper provides a review of the technique and applies it to the modeling of the dynamics of volatilities and trade characteristics using order book data from the Australian Stock Exchange, but not the evolution of limit order depths -our modelling object of interest. On the other hand, while the paper by Russell and Kim (2010) models precisely this object, it adopts a different approach that focuses on predicting total market depth and combines it with estimated distribution of depths across price levels. Their model therefore never predicts zero depth at any individual price level, a scenario that could plausibly happen especially with depths away from the market before critical news announcements (see for example Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) ). Our newly introduced class of order book models based on the multiplicative error structure allows us to model the evolution separately for each price tier, be able to predict economically sensible possibilities, and uncover interesting insights into the dynamics of liquidity in the Treasury market.
We now turn to describing the general multiplicative error framework and the estimation strategy. Let X t be a non-negative time series of interest. The multiplicative error class of models specifies the evolution of X t as follows:
where t is the multiplicative error with a conditional distribution that has a unit mean and positive support, and z t are weakly exogenous variables. 5 The distributional assumption usually adopted is the Gamma(1, a). As shown by Engle and Gallo (2006) , the estimation of (1)- (2) is greatly simplified if the Gamma parameter a is chosen a priori, without loss in consistency and efficiency. In particular, these authors show that for any given a, (1)-(2) can be estimated as if √ X t followed a GARCH model with zero conditional mean. Finally, following Cipollini, Engle, and Gallo (2006) , we set a = 1.
6 This choice guarantees that the likelihood function is well behaved for values of X t near or exactly at zero. For more details of this framework, see Appendix 1.
A New Class of Dynamic Order Book Models
In this section, we introduce our new class of dynamic order book models built upon the multiplicative error structure discussed earlier. We first set out the baseline model, which then serves as the main frame for the richer specifications. These are designed to explore the impact of various measures of volatility on liquidity, as well as the cascade effect between adjacent liquidity levels in the limit order book.
Let X S,i t be the market depth at tier i on side S of the market at time interval t,
7
S ∈ {Ask, Bid}, i = 1, 2, ..., 5, and the time interval length is five minutes. There are thus 10 processes in total. For the baseline specification, we assume the unit exponential distribution for S,i t as discussed earlier and adopt the order of (1,1) for the conditional mean µ S,i t :
5 In specifications without z t , Engle (2002) shows that positive means and stationary distributions for X t can be achieved if the sum of α's and β's is less than 1. If exogenous variables are included, as long as they are non-negative valued, the sufficient condition to ensure the nonnegativity of X t is that the associated coefficients c are positive, but this is not necessary.
6 Thus, the error distribution reduces to a unit exponential. 7 More precisely, the time interval t is the product of day d and time of day j where d = 1, 2, ..., D with D being the total number of days in the sample, and j = 1, 2, ..., J with J being the total number of five-minute intervals in a day. In this paper, J = 120.
The impact of volatility on liquidity is then addressed by augmenting the baseline specification in (3) with an appropriate measure of volatility. Theoretical models for the relationship between liquidity and volatility include Handa and Schwartz (1996) and Foucault (1999) among others.
The former model shows that transitory volatility attracts more limit orders as the expected gains from liquidity provision via limit orders exceed the potential loss from trading with informed parties. It is useful to clarify that, in this model, volatility is transitory in the sense that it is caused by price fluctuations due to random liquidity demand, as opposed to permanent price changes caused by some inside information. The latter model is based on a game theoretic setting in which a trader can choose to submit market or limit orders. When volatility increases, the probability of limit orders being adversely picked off is high, and as such larger compensation in the form of widening spreads is demanded. However, this increases trading costs for market order trading and subsequently makes limit orders relatively more attractive. In a nutshell, both models predict a positive relationship between volatility and liquidity supplied by limit orders. Empirical evidence in support of this relationship has been documented, most notably in Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) for stocks on Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
However, evidence to the contrary is also available. Kavajecz (1999) documents lower depth around information events for 144 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange and interprets this finding as a consequence of specialists and limit order traders trying to reduce their exposure to adverse selection costs. Ranaldo (2004) observes that limit order traders on the Swiss Stock Exchange reduce the market depth and widen the bid-ask spread during moments of trading uncertainty. Similarly, using data from the D2000-2 electronic USD/DEM brokering system, Danielsson and Payne (2010) show that when volatility increases, the order book thins out as liquidity suppliers limit their exposure to being picked off by informed traders. Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) show that bid-ask spreads in the Treasury market widen sharply around macroeconomic announcements, and Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) show that there is often no displayed depth right before scheduled Federal Open Market Committee announcements. These studies side with the critique acknowledged in Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) that limit order traders could be unwilling to submit limit orders when there is increased uncertainty in the market, as limit trading is also very costly in such an environment.
Beside the lack of consensus among documented evidence, the dominance of empirical results for equity limit order markets makes it particularly worthwhile to explore the fixed income market, especially during the recent credit crisis. Almost unique to the Treasury market is the so-called flight-to-quality, when, in crisis times, market participants increasingly seek to hold these securities to reduce their exposure to heightened credit risk inherent in other assets. It would be immensely interesting to see how liquidity in this market behaves in the highly volatile climate during the crisis, and whether the crisis has changed the nature of the relationship. In the following paragraphs, we detail the different ways to look at volatility 6 and the corresponding specifications.
Realized Volatility
The first immediate measure of volatility is the realized volatility, estimated by summing higher frequency squared returns for each five-minute interval throughout the day. Beside the simplicity in computation, the main advantage of this measure of volatility, as discussed by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (1999) , is that it is effectively error-and modelfree. We denote the square root of this measure by RV P S,i t and include it in the following specification: µ
News Impact Curve
The second way we propose to look at volatility in this paper is through a structure that accounts for both the magnitude and the sign of price fluctuations, in the spirit of the news impact curve technique introduced by Nelson (1991) for GARCH models. This original framework is designed to allow the conditional variance process of a given asset's returns to respond asymmetrically to positive and negative price changes. In our proposed model, this technique is highly useful in detecting the asymmetry, if present, in the way liquidity responds to price fluctuations. The model allows us to find out, not only if price fluctuations have any bearing on liquidity supply, but also if this supply discriminates between good and bad news. Following Nelson (1991) , we specify the news impact curve ("NIC") as:
where Ret S,i t is defined as the five-minute returns (annualized log returns) corresponding to the relevant tier's price. Note that we do not have the term E|Ret S,i t | as in Nelson (1991) 's original specification since we implicitly assume that the high frequency returns are zero in expectation. With this specification, the impact of upward price movements on liquidity supply can be interpreted via (θ + γ), while that of negative fluctuations via (γ − θ).
8 Adding this news impact curve structure onto our basic multiplicative error framework, we have:
Theoretically, the addition of Ret S,i t to the model could be a concern in ensuring the non-negativeness of µ S,i t . Practically, however, this is not a problem as the variation in Ret S,i t is small compared to ω and can be absorbed by the latter, leaving the non-negativeness intact.
Volatility of Liquidity
In this section, we introduce the notion of realized depth volatility as a measure of liquidity risk and supplement our understanding of the liquidity-volatility relationship by looking at the potential effect of liquidity uncertainty on the level of liquidity.
We compute the realized volatility of limit order depth at each level in the book (the square root of which is denoted by RV D S,i t ) by aggregating all one-second squared depth changes for each five-minute interval. This measure has several advantages. First, from the measurement standpoint, it is not contaminated by the so-called microstructure noise as is the case with the realized price volatility computed from ultra-frequency data, as discussed in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2007) .
Second, this measure complements well the realized price volatility in enhancing our understanding of the various sources of uncertainty in the market. On the one hand, the volatility of liquidity is closely related with the volatility of price. When the book is fluctuating actively, the resulting temporary order imbalances induce increased short-run price volatility (see Handa and Schwartz (1996) ). This is particularly likely to happen with a thin book: e.g. a market order can create a large imbalance causing the price to change, or sweep more than one tiers' depth causing the price queues to move forward. In that case, we could expect the volatility of depth and volatility of price to move together and leave similar impacts on liquidity supply. On the other hand, for a deep book, it is possible for the depth to change without causing a change in price, especially when market orders are small relative to the available depth. Accordingly, examining the volatility of depth and whether it helps to predict the subsequent level of liquidity would give us additional understanding otherwise not possible with the volatility of price alone.
Third, apart from the standard intepretation of realized volatility as representing the level of liquidity uncertainty, the realized volatility of depth provides an interesting way to gauge the level of liquidity demand in the market. The intuition is that, when the book experiences many changes in a five-minute interval, it is likely due to an increased need for immediacy in the market, which induces frequent replenishment of liquidity in the book. Incorporating the realized volatility of depth into our modeling framework could help us make inferences on whether the demand for liquidity stimulates more supply of liquidity. Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) have found that a scarcity of liquidity makes supplying liquidity more valuable to the market, subsequently attracting more liquidity provision.
With this newly introduced measure, we can study the impact of liquidity risk on the level of liquidity using the following specification:
Direction of Causality
Although the main interest in this paper is to predict liquidity, the question of whether liquidity has any bearing on volatility is also relevant. Handa and Schwartz (1996) 's model seems to suggest that this is not a one-way relationship -a notion that has been supported empirically in Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) . With a better understanding of the dynamic interactions between liquidity and volatility, we should be able to improve our ability to forecast liquidity beyond one period ahead. We set up an autoregressive framework for volatility that incorporates liquidity shocks ( S,i t ) as an explanatory variable. Liquidity shocks are the disturbances from our liquidity model in (4). These shocks indicate the extent to which actual liquidity deviates from the level our model would predict after taking into account the natural evolution of liquidity and the impact of lagged volatility. The specification is as follows:
Liquidity in Non-Volatile Times
Finally, we address the issue of how liquidity behaves in the absence of price uncertainty. We focus our attention on those intervals during which the whole pricing structure remains the same. We implement this idea by adding to the baseline model in (3) a dummy variable for no price change across all five tiers on both sides. The coefficient on this dummy would tell us whether the stability of prices by itself is a determinant of liquidity supply.
Cascade Effect
This part of the empirical analysis looks at how the decision to supply liquidity at an individual tier is affected by the amount of liquidity queueing in front of it. In his seminal work on liquidity provision in a limit order book, Seppi (1997) models the limit order submission decision of competitive, risk-neutral traders based on the zero marginal profit condition. In other words, limit orders at a given price level are submitted until the marginal expected profit of order submission at that tier reaches zero. The marginal expected profit for limit orders at a given tier hinges on the probability of execution at that tier (i.e. the probability of an arriving market order sufficiently large to reach that tier). This probability in turn depends on the amount of depth queuing in front of the tier. Seppi (1997) 's model would predict that, the thinner the book at the preceding tiers, the higher the probability of execution for the current tier, and accordingly the higher the amount of liquidity that can be supplied before the expected marginal profit is driven to zero for that tier.
However, a thin book may also signify general market conditions unfavorable to limit order trading, in which case we would expect a lower level of liquidity even at the current tier. Härdle, Hautsch, and Mihoci (2009) argue that the multiple bid and ask depths can be reasonably assumed to be driven by only a few common factors containing most underlying information -an assumption that underlies their dynamic semiparametric factor model of the limit order book. An empirical investigation of how depths at adjacent tiers are interrelated and which message we can read from depths at preceding tiers could shed light on which hypothesis is more fitting in explaining reality. This exercise also helps lay the groundwork for our future extension to a multivariate modeling framework.
We use two alternative specifications for this task, one using the cumulative depth and the other using just the depth at the preceding tier:
where CD S,i−1 t−1 is the cumulative depth at tier i−1 that has been adjusted by its corresponding intradaily mean, and µ
where X
is the seasonally adjusted depth at tier i − 1.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
U.S. Treasury securities are debt instruments issued by the U.S. government through public auctions, and subsequently traded in the secondary market. The secondary market is structured as a multi-dealer, over-the-counter market. The dealers trade with their customers, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and with one another (see Fleming and Mizrach (2009) ). Prior to 1999, this market is based on a network of voice-assisted brokers. Fully electronic trading only started in 1999 with the introduction of the eSpeed platform, followed by the BrokerTec platform in 2000 (see Fleming and Mizrach (2009) ). Mizrach and Neely (2006) estimate that the BrokerTec platform accounts for about 61 percent of all inter-dealer trading activity. The increased availability of ultra-frequency data brought about by electronic trading enables many authors to look at the microstructure of this market in much greater depth. However, studies of the Treasury order book are still outnumbered by studies using equity order books, despite the central role of this market in meeting investors' demand for liquidity in safe assets, especially during crisis times. This motivates us to look at the sample period from 2006 to 2009, because 1) the earlier period has been studied by Fleming and Mizrach (2009) , among others, and 2) this period is long enough to cover a reasonable time span before and after the recent crisis and enables us to observe how liquidity dynamics change through this time. The after crisis period is limited to the end of 2009 due to the availability of data.
Each day, trading starts at the opening of the Tokyo market and lasts until the closing of the market in New York. During these hours, dealers send in their quotes, specifying the quantities available for buy and sell and their associated prices. These quotes are then queued in the order book according to the price and time priority rules until executed or canceled. The quotes are only good for the day. Although trading spans almost 22-23 hours a day, Fleming and Mizrach (2009) document that trading outside of the U.S. market opening hours is relatively minimal. Therefore we limit our analysis to between 7:00 and 17:00 Eastern time, when most market activities occur.
The BrokerTec Order Book Data
We use the order book data from the BrokerTec network, which covers a larger part of the overall Treasury secondary market trading. All order messages sent to this platform throughout the day are captured and time-stamped to the milisecond. The order book snapshot data is then constructed by accumulating these order changes at the corresponding price tiers. This results in a tick-by-tick dataset with market depths measured in millions of dollars (par value), while prices reported in 256ths of a point, where a point equals one percent of the par value.
9 We focus our attention on the on-the-run 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes, as these are among the most actively traded Treasury notes in terms of dollar trading volume (see Fleming and Mizrach (2009) for a detailed review of the microstructure of the Treasury market). The 2-year and 5-year notes are newly issued every month, while the 10-year note comes out every quarter with reopenings in the following month and two months.
For empirical analysis, we choose to work with the five-minute snapshot data, supplemented by the one-second snapshot data needed for the computation of realized volatility measures. In addition, we focus solely on the best five price tiers on each side of the market. The five-minute snapshot data is extracted from the tick data described above by taking the last snapshot of each five-minute interval, resulting in 120 observations in total for each day, for the four year period spanning 2006-2009. The one-second snapshot data is extracted from the tick data in the same fashion.
Although the data is available tick-by-tick, our choice of the five-minute interval largely avoids data errors (e.g. erroneous order messages that enter and exit the book in split seconds) and microstructure noises inherent in ultra-high frequencies. The interval is also long enough for sufficient movements in the book, so that meaningful observations can be made. Additionally, a major part of our empirical work is investigating whether volatility has any bearing on the supply of liquidity in the Treasury market. This thus begs the question of which frequency is optimal for measuring realized volatility. Using volatility signature plots devised by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (1999) , we find that the impact of microstructure noise diminishes and levels off at around three to five minute frequency.
Summary Statistics
We report the summary statistics separately for three sub-sample periods: before, during and after crisis. We date the start of the crisis to August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas announced that it could not value assets in three of its investment funds (see Boyd (2007) ). This date is widely believed to mark the start of the financial crisis, when money markets in the U.S. and overseas faced dramatic changes in response to the rising concerns over the credit quality of financial assets linked to subprime mortgages (see Fleming and Klagge (2010) , Taylor and Williams (2009) Average Depth Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of market depths on the BrokerTec platform for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes. Prior to the crisis, the average depth at the best pricing tier of the 2-year note is over $400 million. It plummeted to roughly one fifth this level during the crisis period, showing the extent of the liquidity dry-up in this market.
Coming out of the crisis, the market recovers somewhat, but it is still far below the pre-crisis level. It is useful to note that the issue sizes have actually steadily increased over the sample period.
11 This indicates that the decline we observe during the crisis is likely attributable to participants withdrawing liquidity from the market, and not to a declining issue size.
[Insert Table 1 here]
This liquidity drain seems consistent with the well known flight-to-quality phenomenon. During the financial crisis, investors increasingly disinvest in risky assets and instead hold on to Treasury securities to lower their risk exposure. Accordingly, the part of liquidity that is usually supplied by purely disinterested providers may be largely gone. The low level of liquidity remained in the market during the crisis could possibly come from traders with a real demand for liquidity, who can wait a little for better prices by posting limit orders in the book, as opposed to sending in market orders.
Similar trend can be observed for the 5-and 10-year securities: the pre-crisis average depth is about $72-73 million, before dropping to a level slightly above $20 million when the crisis hits. However, unlike the weak recovery observed with the 2-year note, the market depth for the 5-and 10-year notes does not improve after the crisis. Before the crisis, the 2-year note has about five times more liquidity at the best quotes than the 5-and 10-year notes. The delayed recovery of the latter securities after the crisis further widens this gap: it grows to about eight-fold in the later half of 2009. Paris Bourse. They attribute this finding to the fact that trading consumes liquidity at the front line. Figure 1 provides a visual description of the order book shape. This figure shows the fraction of total market depth on each side that is posted at each of the best five price tiers. Ask price tiers are indexed by positive numbers from 1 to 5, with 1 being the best ask quote. Bid price tiers are indexed similarly using negative numbers, with -1 being the best bid quote. It is clearly evident that, in the post-crisis period, depth is less likely to be posted at or near the inside quotes, and more likely to be queued at the outer tiers, consistently among all three securities. Liquidity providers seem to be less aggressive and place more emphasis on getting better prices relative to the risk of non-execution at outer tiers.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Bid-Ask Spread
The bid-ask spread is another useful indicator that supplements our characterization of the level of liquidity in this market. In a liquid market, where the supply of liquidity is plentiful, the competition among liquidity providers would drive down the spread. On the contrary, if the supply is scarce, liquidity providers would be able to charge a premium via posting a wider spread. An analysis of the inside spread, presented in Figure 2 , shows that, for all three securities considered, the spread is quite tight, with an average of slightly above one tick.
12 The tight spread around the minimum allowable price movement suggests a very liquid market. This observation illustrates the point made in Longstaff (2004) that, in addition to the credit quality of U.S. Treasury securities, the enormous liquidity enjoyed by these securities also adds value -the so-called flight-to-liquidity premium.
[Insert Figure 2 here] Similar to the pattern in market depths that points to a major liquidity dry-up at the height of the crisis, the inside spread spikes up many folds (especially with the 5-and 10-year notes) during the crisis period, before coming back to hovering over one tick in late 2009. The 2-year note, once again, appears to experience the smoothest ride through the crisis.
Price Volatility
We measure the realized volatility as the square root of the five-minute sum of squared secondto-second price changes, and present the summary statistics in Table 2 . Taking into account the difference in tick size, the 2-year note exhibits a more stable price environment than both the 5-and the 10-year notes. For example, before the crisis, prices fluctuate by less than 1.5 ticks on average for the former, and by almost 3 ticks on average for the latter, with the volatility generally increasing toward the outer tiers. Time series wise, we observe a changing pattern in volatility throughout the crisis. Volatility roughly doubles during the crisis, for all three securities. However, only the 2-year volatility returns relatively closer to its pre-crisis level, whereas the two longer term notes are still much more volatile than they were before the crisis. Following the crisis, given the still large amount of uncertainty about future macroeconomic conditions and the speed of economic recovery, it seems that the longer-term notes are not as attractive as the 2-year note. This evidence again supports the finding that the 2-year note looks like the most liquid and resilient among the three fixed income securities considered.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Variability of Liquidity
While the realized volatility of price illustrates the extent to which market participants change their valuation of the securities, the realized volatility of depths provides us with a different measure of how active the book is moving around. A large fluctuation in market depths can be open to two different interpretations: 1) the uncertainty over liquidity supply such that the amount offered for buy and sell varies quite a bit (for example, order modifications and cancelations could change the book even in the absence of trading), and 2) the high level of trading activities that consumes market depths and induces frequent movements of liquidity in the book.
In Table 3 , where we present the summary statistics of this measure, two main observations can be made. First, the 2-year note has the largest level of variation in market depth at all tiers, much larger than that of the 5-year and 10-year notes. Over the sample period, this realized variation declines during the crisis, and shows no noticeable recovery in the six months thereafter. The higher variability of depth in the 2-year note appears to be a result of more active trading in this market, which could explain more frequent replenishments and movements in the book. Second, this measure is greatest at the inside bid and ask -the very first tier against which trades are executed. This is a natural result since liquidity at the first tier inherits an additional source of randomness from trading.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Time Series Trends of Liquidity and Price Volatility
The presented summary statistics seem to suggest that liquidity and price volatility move in opposite directions in and out of the crisis. Figure 3 provides a time series depiction of what the market has gone through during the sample period. As shown on the graph, the total market depth 13 starts to decline sharply while volatility slowly heads up in mid 2007, providing evidence of mounting pressures on the Treasury market at the onset of the crisis.
When the crisis officially hits, liquidity drops to the bottom while volatility sky-rockets. The easing of liquidity does not start until the beginning of 2009. The graph once again shows the stronger recovery in the 2-year note market.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Intradaily Patterns and Impacts of Announcements
Intradaily Pattern of Depths Figure 4 shows the total market depth over five-minute intervals throughout the day. Although not shown, market depth at the individual tiers follows the same pattern. This figure one more time shows the great extent to which liquidity has dropped during and after the crisis from its pre-crisis level, yet the pattern remains quite consistent. Liquidity in the book builds up in the morning, reaches its peak before noon and gradually declines from there. There are major dips that happen shortly before 8:30, 10:00 and 13:00. This evidently illustrates the importance of macroeconomic news on the fixed income market, as most key economic indicators are released monthly or quarterly at 8:30 (e.g. monthly CPI, PPI, Employment Situation, quarterly GDP, Housing Starts, Retail Sales) and 10:00(e.g. Business Inventories, Housing Market Index, New Home Sales, Existing Home Sales, Philadelphia Fed Survey) on non-overlapping days throughout the month. The 13:00 dip is likely associated with the release of Treasury auction results, which happens monthly for each of the securities.
14 We do not see any irregularity around 14:15, the time around which the Federal Open Market Committee announces its policy decision after its scheduled meetings ("FOMC announcements").
15 This could be due to the small numbers of days in the sample with such an announcement that the announcement effect, if any, is averaged out.
[Insert Figure 4 here] To see the impact of macro announcements discussed above more cleanly, we separate days with announcements from those without and plot the respective intradaily patterns for a comparison. We look at three types of announcements for which we have data, i.e. FOMC announcements, Treasury auction result announcements, and key macroeconomics announcements that are made at 8:30.
16 Figure 5 provides further evidence on the disappearance of liquidity immediately before these announcements and the replenishment of the order book minutes after those, and documents the effect of FOMC announcements otherwise not apparent from the aggregate pattern in Figure 4 . This is consistent with the findings documented in Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) , and seems to suggest a "wait-and-see" tendency of limit order traders toward these announcements.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Intradaily Pattern of Volatility
We now turn to describing the intradaily pattern of price volatility, as measured by the realized volatility of the best bid-ask mid point. As shown in Figure 6 , volatility spikes at the key time marks we have seen earlier with liquidity, i.e. 8:30, 10:00, 13:00 and 14:15. It seems that the anticipation leading to key scheduled announcements, and possible increased trading activities after the news come out, are responsible for these volatility peaks. We also examine the effect of announcements on volatility by comparing its intradaily pattern on announcement days with that on non-announcement days and find considerable increases in volatility around the relevant time marks (see Figure 7) .
[Insert Figures 6 and 7 here]

Adjustment for Intradaily Seasonality
In light of the clear intradaily seasonality of market depth documented in the preceeding paragraphs, it is important to account for this seasonality in modelling. We choose to adjust for this intradaily pattern by dividing the relevant market depth at a given time interval, X S,i t , by the corresponding sample average taken at the same time of day. For example, market depth observed at 9:15 on a given day is adjusted by the mean depth taken at 9:15 across all days in the sample. Furthermore, given the differences in average depth levels among the three sub-sample periods, we use three separate sets of intradaily means corresponding to the three sub-sample periods in seasonally adjusting X S,i t .
Empirical Analysis
The Baseline Model
In this section, we report the estimation result of the baseline model as specified in (3). Table  4 provides the estimates for this model, based on the whole data sample as well as the three sub-samples. As expected, the order book exhibits a high level of persistence, as represented by the sum α + β close to 1. This is especially the case with the outer tiers. The inside tier is always the least persistent among the best five tiers, perhaps due to the additional randomness from trading activities. The inside depths of the 5-year note in particular has the lowest level of persistence, as compared to that of the 2-and 10-year counterparts.
Another interesting pattern to note from these estimates is that the AR coefficient is increasing, while the MA coefficient is declining, as one moves away from the best quotes. This pattern is in line with our expectation that, the further away from the inside tier, the more relevant the lagged value is in predicting market depth. The order of trade execution, with liquidity posted at the best quotes to be consumed first, gives rise to the ascending degree of liquidity staleness as we move towards the outer tiers. Consequently, the outer tiers become more and more autoregressive.
[Insert table 4 here]
Liquidity and Realized Volatility
The estimates for the model using the realized volatility of price are reported in Table 5 . An increase in price volatility generally predicts a decrease in market depth at the top tier, whether we estimate the model using the whole sample data or separately by sub-periods. This evidence apparently suggests that limit order traders tend to cut back on their supply at the top tier for fear that their orders would be adversely executed in a volatile market. It is also consistent with the evidence documented by many previous studies, including Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) , that an increased level of trading is often associated with moments of high price volatility. More active trading could deplete liquidity in the book that is not subsequently replenished fast enough, especially if potential liquidity suppliers hesitate to supply to a volatile market. The shrinkage of liquidity following a rise in volatility is also in line with a proposition put forth by Caballero and Kurlat (2008) that when asset price volatility rises, the risk of illiquidity rises.
[Insert table 5 here]
There are some interesting and changing dynamics at the outer tiers. Prior to the crisis, liquidity outside the top tier is actually positively related with volatility. This evidence seems to fit with Handa and Schwartz (1996) 's theory on the trade-off between increased compensation to liquidity suppliers in times of high volatility, and increased potential loss from being adversely picked off. Due to the lower priority of execution, the risk of being adversely picked off is less of an issue among the outside tiers. Accordingly, liquidity providers could find it worth their while to supply more liquidity. However, when the crisis is under way, the volatility effect is much smaller in magnitude, and sometime even changes to a negative one (mostly observed in the 10-year notes). It seems that the crisis has raised concerns over the price risk to the extent that it changes the balance between better prices and increased pick-off risk discussed earlier. The risk consideration may offset, or even outweight, the better compensation for supplying liquidity in a volatile market. Coming out of the crisis, volatility regains some of its importance in explaining liquidity in the same direction as in the pre-crisis period, but the magnitude is generally smaller.
In summary, we find that liquidity at the best quotes tends to shrink following an increase in price volatility. On the other hand, liquidity away from the best quotes often appears to be more plentiful with increased price risk, except for the crisis period. The shift over time in the direction of increased concern over price uncertainty is consistent with the pattern we document earlier in Section 4 that during and after the crisis, market participants are more likely to post their limit orders away from the market, and less likely at the inside tier where the potential for adverse execution is greatest.
5.3 Liquidity and the News Impact Curve Table 6 shows the estimation results for the specification using the news impact curve in (6).
It is useful to recall that the impact of a price increase on liquidity supply can be interpreted via (θ + γ), while that of a price decrease via (γ − θ). Specifically, (θ + γ) shows the change in market depth following an annualized log price increase of 100%, or 0.0032% increase over a five-minute interval. Similarly, (γ − θ) shows the change in market depth following a price decline of 0.0032% over the previous five-minute interval. Another point to note is that market depth has been standardized by the appropriate intradaily mean, so it is interpreted as the deviation away from what we usually observe at the same time of the day. For example, a market depth of 1.1 at 9:00 am on a given day indicates that the depth is 10% higher than usual.
[ Insert table 6 here]
For brevity, we do not report the estimates for ω, α and β as they are consistently significant and very similar to the estimates obtained from the baseline model. The estimates in Table 6 are magnified by 10 3 for easy viewing. We also experiment with using the returns based on the inside mid point, and obtain qualitatively similar results. Several observations are in order.
First, liquidity at the best quotes tends to decline following price movements, regardless of the direction. This is consistent with the negative relationship between volatility and top tier liquidity described earlier. However, we can see that liquidity adjusts assymetrically in magnitude in response to price increases versus decreases, as captured by γ. The asymmetry is strongest before the crisis, becomes less pronounced during the crisis, and almost disappears thereafter. Considering this evidence, in combination with the reduced importance of volatility in predicting liquidity during and after the crisis documented earlier, one may argue that, during the crisis, the liquidity supplied by truly willing providers dries up, leaving in the market only traders who have an exogenous need for buying/selling, yet enough patience to post limit orders as opposed to market orders. In such an instance, the bid and ask quantities in the book more likely reflect the exogenous demand for less-than-immediate liquidity and accordingly become less responsive to price fluctuations in both magnitude and direction. Second, the relationship between liquidity and price change is quite different at the outside tiers. Specifically, ask depths tend to increase more with increasing prices than with decreasing prices of the same magnitude, while the reverse is true for bid depths. This pattern is consistent with the "buy low, sell high" principle: increasing prices indicate favorable condition for selling orders, more so than for buying orders, while with decreasing prices, limit order traders would rather buy than sell. One may notice an opposite pattern, seemingly contradicting this principle, at the inside tier. However, there is a major difference in terms of trade execution that set the inside depth apart from the rest: it is at the front line of execution against market orders. Changes in quoted prices, say an increase, could signal an increased valuation of a given security, making it more desirable in the market place. This in turn could invite more buy market orders than market sells. Subsequently, the inside ask depth is depleted more than the inside bid depth. Similarly, market order traders could infer from a decline in the quoted prices that the notes are less valuable, an inference that could prompt more market sells than market buys, resulting in the larger erosion of the inside bid depth as compared to the ask depth.
In sum, the evidence collected from the model using realized volatility of price and news impact curve generally points to a negative attitude toward volatility on the part of liquidity suppliers, particularly with respect to liquidity at the inside tier. However, during and after the crisis, liquidity exhibits a lower responsiveness to volatility, probably reflecting the disappearance of pure liquidity providers and that the remaining liquidity in the book is more likely to come from market participants with exogenous needs for liquidity.
Liquidity and the Volatility of Depths
The impact of liquidity uncertainty on the level of liquidity supply is reported in Table  7 . According to this table, the variability and the level of market depths are positively related. In other words, following intervals of active movements in the book, liquidity supply becomes more plentiful. This makes intuitive sense, whether one interprets the volatility of depths as representative of supply uncertainty (e.g. that associated with increased order modifications/cancellations), or as a sign of a strong demand for liquidity (e.g. that associated with increased trading activities). In the former interpretation, the uncertainty of supply may increase the payoffs to those who can actually provide liquidity, thus encouraging them to supply more. Similarly, if it is the strong demand for trading that induces frequent movements of liquidity, the demand would increase compensation for liquidity provision and subsequently invite more depth. This finding supports Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995)'s conclusion that more liquidity is supplied when it is valuable to the marketplace.
[Insert table 7 here]
Reciprocal Impact of Liquidity on Volatility
This section reports the result of the autoregressive regression of volatility with liquidity shocks as an added explanatory variable, presented in Table 8 . The model estimates show that a negative liquidity shock generally predicts an increase in the subsequent volatility. This is consistent with Parlour and Seppi (2008) 's assessment that prices are more volatile in thin markets, as the lack of liquidity could hinder the price discovery process, causing more uncertainty about the security value.
[Insert table 8 here]
Liquidity in Non-Volatile Times
Isolating the effect of price volatility, we explore the dynamics of liquidity when providers of liquidity face little price risk, defined in this paper as those intervals over which there is no change in the best five prices on both sides of the book. Results are reported in Table 9 . We find that liquidity at the inside tier rises after moments of unchanging prices. This is true for all three securities and all subsample periods, although the price stability seems to matter more to market participants in the 5-and 10-year notes. The take-away from this evidence is that the stability of the whole price schedule seems to provide significant assurance to hesitant liquidity providers and bring out more liquidity supply than otherwise available.
[Insert table 9 here]
At the outside tiers, the effect of stable prices on liquidity is much smaller in magnitude, and tends to be negative over the whole sample period. The pre-crisis effects are also very similar, i.e. the lack of movement in the whole pricing schedule predicts a lower depth level at the outside tiers, in contrast with the increased supply at the inside tier. This evidence seems to suggest a movement of liquidity to the front line, indicating an increased level of confidence and eagerness of liquidity suppliers in having their orders executed as quickly as possible.
The crisis period shows a significant change in the behavior of liquidity suppliers toward price stability, especially in the 5-and 10-year notes. Instead of reducing liquidity at the outside tiers while increasing liquidity at the best quotes, suppliers now tend to increase the supply across the tiers, not just the top one. While price stability is still considered a positive market condition from the suppliers' perspective, they do not seem as aggressive as before the crisis. After the crisis, evidence of liquidity responding to price stability is largely gone, except for the inside tiers. For the 2-year notes, we do not see a major change of direction in how liquidity suppliers respond to price stability in and out of the crisis, but their aggressiveness is also somewhat reduced during the crisis time.
Overall, the results obtained in this section seem to indicate that a stable price environment likely gives market participants more confidence to supply liquidity in the book, especially at the first tier where the risk of adverse execution is greatest. This finding, coupled with our earlier findings on the relationship between liquidity and volatility, enhances our understanding of how risk plays a role in the supply of liquidity in this market. It is evident that the source of uncertainty matters: if it is the price uncertainty, liquidity tends to be reduced, whereas if it is the uncertainty of depth, increased supply seems to follow.
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Cascade Effect
Evidence for the relationship between liquidity supplied at a given tier and that at its preceding tier is presented in Table 10 . Due to similarity of estimates and for brevity, we present here only the estimates for the model using cumulative depths. Since the model takes into account depth at the immediately front tier, the analysis starts from the second tier's depth. We document a consistently positive relationship between depths at adjacent tiers, suggesting that market participants seem to adjust liquidity at different tiers in the same direction in response to some common market factors, outweighing the marginal expected profit consideration. Specifically, the increased marginal expected profit due to a lower cumulative depth at the preceding tier may not be sufficient to justify the very cost that has discouraged market participants to submit limit orders at all preceding tiers in the first place.
A noteworthy observation from these tables is that the second tier depth is the least impacted by the first tier depth. On the other hand, depth at the third, fourth and fifth tiers behave rather similarly toward their respective front-liners. A mechanical explanation for this observation can be offered: there is an additional source of variation at the first tier depth caused by trading, so a thinner inside tier does not necessarily mean a worsening condition for limit order trading. It could well be due to market trading activities that erode the inside depth and reduce its predictive power on the next tier's depth.
[ Insert table 10 here] To summarize, the evidence of liquidity rising/falling across the board here shows that dealers tend to base their liquidity provision decision on some common market conditions, more so than they do on the consideration of marginal expected profit at each tier. It could be that the change in the probability of execution is too small to make a big difference on the level of depth supplied. Alternatively, the zero profit condition may not be reached empirically, a point made by Parlour and Seppi (2008) in response to the difficulty encountered when Sandås (2001) tries to test this break-even condition.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new class of dynamic order book models based on the multiplicative error framework introduced by Engle (2002) . This class of models offers important advantages over the standard linear framework often used in prior studies of limit order books. First and foremost, it guarantees the prediction of non-negative depths -a key economic feature of the limit order book -something that the linear models may have difficulty with. Second, zero depths are valid outcomes but cannot be addressed by a log linear specification designed to ensure the non-negativity of depths. Third, by modelling the limit order book in a similar fashion to asset price volatility models, we can capitalize on the vast literature in the latter to tailor our model specifications in ways that could capture the dynamics between liquidity and volatility as closely as possible. Lastly, in addition to the novel use of the MEM framework to model the dynamics of limit order book, we also introduce the notion of realized volatility of depth, which is parallel in concept to realized volatility of price, yet offers additional insights otherwise not apparent with the latter alone, when one examines the effect of uncertainty.
Our proposed models reveals some interesting dynamics of liquidity in the market for the three most popular medium-term Treasury notes. Most importantly, volatility and liquidity at the top tier exhibit a negative relationship, which runs in both directions. In other words, an increase in volatility predicts a decrease in market depth, and such a decrease then tends to be followed by a further increase in volatility. Furthermore, during the crisis, liquidity at most tiers, not just the top one, becomes negatively related with volatility. The back-and-forth interaction between liquidity and volatility as documented helps explain spells of liquidity falling while volatility rising, and conversely, liquidity rising while volatility falling, especially during the crisis period. To this extent, our finding contradicts that of Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) . These authors find that when volatility rises, market depth also increases, which in turn helps reduce the subsequent volatility. We find results similar to theirs only for market depths behind the best quotes, where the risk of adverse execution is lower than that at the top tier, and only before the crisis that has seemingly shifted market participants' attitude toward greater concerns over the price risk.
The documented evidence of a negative relationship between liquidity and volatility seems to suggest a disinclination of traders toward price risk, who seek to reduce their exposure by lowering the supply when the level of price uncertainty increases. Absent of price fluctuations, they appear to be more willing to supply liquidity to the market.
In contrast to the negative interaction between liquidity and price uncertainty, we find that an increased level of liquidity risk tends to stimulate more supply. It is possible that, when faced with an uncertain liquidity supply, market participants are willing to pay more for the provision of liquidity. The increased payoffs to liquidity providers subsequently invite additional liquidity to the market.
Finally, the supply of liquidity at one tier is positively related with the supply at its preceding tier, supporting the idea that liquidity across different tiers in the book rises and falls with some common market factors. This finding suggest that perhaps a multivariate framework in which depths are modeled as one object with interrelated components could help us capture better the movement of liquidity in the limit order book.
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Appendix 1: The Multiplicative Error Model
Let X t be a non-negative time series of interest. The multiplicative error class of models specifies the dynamics of X t as:
where t is the multiplicative error with a conditional distribution that has unit mean and non-negative support, and z t are other determinants of X t . Per Engle (2002) , positive means and stationary distributions for X t can be achieved if:
For the conditional distribution of the error, the Gamma(1,a) distribution is often used. In this case, the conditional density of t is given by:
It follows that the conditional density of X t is:
Thus, the log likelihood function is:
When a is not part of the parameters to be estimated, i.e. the conditional distribution of t is pre-specified, the log likelihood function can be shortened as:
where C is a constant that collects all a and X t terms. Maximizing this log-likelihood function is then equivalent to:
where θ = (ω, α, β, c) . This optimization implies the following first order condition:
Note that this first order condition is the same as that of an auxiliary model for √ X t , specified as follows:
Therefore, estimating θ for a multiplicative error model can be done via the estimation of a GARCH model for the square root process with mean zero and conditional variance equation µ t as specified above. If a is also a parameter to be estimated, it can be done via maximizing the log likelihood function afterθ has been obtained. Engle and Gallo (2006) show that the GARCH-like estimation delivers both consistency and efficiency forθ if t ∼ Gamma(1,a) with known a.
A final point to note is that, as Engle and Gallo (2006) pointed out, for non-negative processes to be estimated by maximum likelihood, exact zero values can be problematic as log(X t ) is not defined when X t = 0. However, Cipollini, Engle, and Gallo (2006) clarified that if we choose a = 1, t | t−1 ∼ Exponential (1) and its density collapses to:
We therefore no longer have the term log(X t ) in the log likelihood function, making the function well defined for data containing exact zeros. The realized volatility of price is calculated as the square root of the five-minute sum of squared second-to-second price changes. Prices are reported in 1/256ths and thus the realized volatility inherits the same unit of measurement. This table  documents Table 3 -Realized Volatility of Depth in BrokerTec Order Book for U.S. Treasury Notes.
The realized volatility of depth is calculated as the square root of the five-minute sum of squared second-to-second depth changes. Depths are reported in millions of dollars and thus the realized volatility inherits the same unit of measurement. This table documents is the square root of the five-minute sum of squared price changes at tier i on side S at time interval t. Liquidity shock is then computed as
t . The volatility-liquidity regression is specified as: RV P
t+1 . This specification is estimated for the whole data sample, as well as separately for three sub periods 
